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A CALL FOR OBSCENITY LAW REFORM
Scot A. Duvall*
I. THE NEED FOR OBSCENITY LAW REFORM
As one scholar has noted, the beauty of our Constitution is the document's
capacity for growth that American society nourishes through faith in tolerance.' However,
certain changes in constitutional law, including the law of obscenity, cannot occur unless
the Supreme Court acts to advance the individual's interest in liberty despite the political,
religious, or moral convictions of the majority.2 The need for obscenity law reform is
underscored by recent cases that involve rap group "2 Live Crew" and retailers who sold
the group's allegedly obscene work "As Nasty As They Wanna Be";3 Dennis Barrie and
Associated with the law firm of Stites & Harbison in Louisville, Kentucky. The author is grateful to
professors Jim Lennertz at Lafayette College for his insight that "there are no perfect answers, but some
answers are better than others"; George Panichas at Lafayette College for teaching the Senior Colloquium
that was the inspiration for this article; Brian Murchison at the Washington and Lee School of Law, for his
encouragement and thoughtful criticism; and Ann Massie at the Washington and Lee School of Law, for
suggesting that this Journal would be an ideal forum.
I See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL v. LARRY FLYNT 302-03 (1988) (discussing capacity for
growth in the United States Constitution).
2 See ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 973 (6th ed.
1983) (noting that obscenity reflects shifting social, ethical, and religious values of complex pluralistic
society); Stephen Daniels, The Supreme Court and Obscenity: An Exercise in Empirical Constitutional
Policy-Making, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 757, 757 (1980) (arguing that freedom of expression is paramount
liberty and as such, exceptions must be clearly defined); Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression:
The Regulation of Pornography As Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1633 (1988) (noting that
advocates of censorship of sexually explicit materials generally have religious mindset, and engage in
protecting established verities, cultivating influence, and eliminating heresy); Robert E. Riggs, Miller v.
California Revisited: An Empirical Note, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 268 (noting that vocalness of individuals
and political pressures can affect prosecutors' decisions to prosecute obscenity cases).
3 In February 1990, the Sheriff's Office for Broward County, Florida began an investigation of rap
group 2 Live Crew's "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" recording, in response to complaints by South Florida
residents. As part of the investigation, an undercover officer purchased a cassette tape copy of the recording
from a retailer. The tape was transcribed in part and submitted to a local judge. In March 1990, the judge
found probable cause that the recording was obscene and issued an order to that effect. The Broward
County Sheriff's Office then copied the order and distributed it county-wide to retail establishments as a
"courtesy," warning that the recording was obscene and that sale of the recording constituted a crime.
Within days, all retail stores in Broward County withdrew the 2 Live Crew recording, even though the
recording itself contained the disclaimer "WARNING: EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CONTAINED." The four
members of 2 Live Crew - Luther Campbell, Mark Ross, David Hobbs, and Chris Wongwon - and the
group's record company brought a civil rights suit against the Sheriff in federal court. See Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990). The court in Skyywalker determined that the
recording was obscene. Id. at 596. However, the court also determined that the actions of the Broward
County Sheriff's Office, by presenting retailers with a copy of the local judge's probable cause order and
threatening retailers with arrest for selling the recording, were unconstitutional as an improper prior restraint
of free speech. Id. at 603. Accordingly, the court in Skyywalker permanently enjoined the Sheriff's Office
from such activity. Id. at 603-04. The court's application of federal obscenity law to the 2 Live Crew
recording is highly recommended reading for anyone with an interest in obscenity law and the issues
discussed in this article. See id. at 587-96.
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the Cincinnati Art Center who exhibited 175 photographs taken by the late Robert
Mapplethorpe, seven of which allegedly were obscene;4 and a Georgia man who exhibited
a sticker with the phrase "Shit Happens" on the bumper of his van.5
The decision of MTV and other cable networks to ban singer Madonna's video
for her song "Justify My Love" illustrates the controversy that sexually oriented
expression can generate. 6 Indeed, Bret Ellis' recently published American Psycho, a
In October 1990, a jury convicted the owner of a record store in Fort Lauderdale, Florida of
obscenity charges for selling the recording that the Skyywalker court had declared obscene. See Jon Pareles,
Store Owner Convicted of Obscenity in Album Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at At 8. Later that month,
however, a jury acquitted 2 Live Crew of charges that the group staged an obscene performance at a
Hollywood, Florida night club in June 1990. The performance was a 45-minute adults-only show that
included selections from "As Nasty As They Wanna Be." See Laura Parker, Rap Group Acquitted in
Florida, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21, 1990, at Al. In December 1990, the court spared the retailer a
possible one-year prison term pursuant to his October conviction, but fined him $1,000 plus court costs.
Ironically, the court recommended that the fine be donated to a school for the performing arts. See A Fine
for Selling Obscene Music, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at B16.
4 In April 1990, the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center and its director, Dennis Barrie, were
indicted on two misdemeanor charges: pandering obscenity, and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented
material. Barrie faced a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $l1,000 fine for each count; the gallery
faced a maximum $5,000 fine for each count. The charges were filed on the day the gallery's six-week
exhibition "Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Moment" opened to the public. At issue were seven of the
175 photographs in the exhibition. The charges were based upon five photographs which depicted men in
sado-masochistic or homoerotic poses and two photographs which showed children in the nude. In October
1990, a Cincinnati jury acquitted both the gallery and Barrie of all charges. Robert Mapplethorpe, the artist
who took the photographs, died in 1989 of complications from AIDS. See generally Cincinnati Arts Center
Denies Obscenity Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1990, at B8; Kim Masters, Gallery Must Face Obscenity
Trial, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 7, 1990, at B 1; Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, sec. 1, at 1. Barrie and the gallery incurred more than $300,000 in court-
related costs. See Chuck Philips, A War on Many Fronts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at FI (first installment
of series "Issues in the Arts 1991").
5 See Mark Curridan, But Is It Art?, 17 BARRISTER 13, 35-36 (Winter 1990-9 1) (discussing case in
which Cobb County, Georgia jury found defendant guilty of violating Georgia's law against obscene bumper
stickers, resulting in $100 fine). The Cobb County prosecutor successfully used a "captive audience"
argument that no motorist should have to endure such a "lewd and profane expression." Id. at 36. By
contrast, the defendant argued that the phrase had little to do with sexual or bodily functions, but meant
"strange, unexpected and usually unwelcome events." Id. at 35. But see Cunningham v. State, 400 S.E. 2d
916 (Ga. 1991) (reversing the Cobb County trial court decision referred to above, ruling that the Georgia
statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
6 Singer Madonna's video to her song "Justify My Love" was banned by cable network MTV in
November 1990. In December 1990, Canada's MuchMusic video-music channel joined MTV in rejecting
Madonna's video. However, the video, which has been described as including "steamy scenes of bisexuality
and mild sado-masochism," was aired on late-night British television. See Madonna Suited for Late Night in
Britain, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at 10; see also Morning Report: TV & Video, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990,
at F2. In the United States, ABC News' Nightline showed the video in its entirety on December 3, 1990. In
an interview during that installment, Madonna explained that her video was the "filmic expression of the
song ... It's about a woman who's talking to her lover, and she's saying, 'Tell me your dreams, am I in
them? Tell me your fears, are you scared? Tell me your stories, I'm not afraid of who you are.' And so, you
know, we're dealing with sexual fantasies, and being truthful and honest with our partner, you know. And
these feelings exist." Nightline: Madonna Interview, at 3 (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 3, 1990) (transcript
available on NEXIS). Before airing the video, host Forrest Sawyer cautioned the audience that "[W]e expect
that only adults are watching. You should know this video includes graphic portrayals of sexuality and
nudity." Id. at 2. When asked essentially where she "draws the line," Madonna responded, "I draw the line in
terms of what I think is viewable on television. I draw the line ... with violence and humiliation and
degradation .... [a]nd I don't think any of these issues are evident in my video." Id. at 4.
At the end of the "Justify My Love" video, displayed on the screen is the sentence "Poor is the
man whose pleasure depends on the permission of another." Madonna, Justify My Love (retail video viewed
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fictional literary work that contains descriptions of graphic violence in a sexual context,
was cancelled by his original publisher after excerpts of the book were leaked to the
press.7 Nevertheless, sexually explicit materials can convey ideas worthy of constitutional
protection.' Any coherent model of obscenity law, therefore, should focus not on
controlling sexually explicit materials, but on fostering the trade of such materials in the
marketplace of ideas without the barriers of local censorship.9
Section II sets forth the history of obscenity law in the United States, paying
special attention to the roles of "community standards" and "serious value" in determining
whether material is obscene.' ° Section III critically analyzes the Supreme Court's current
test for obscenity." Section IV discusses the importance of appellate review in obscenity
cases, and how the Supreme Court's current body of obscenity law frustrates appellate
courts' independent review of a jury's obscenity determinations. 12 In addition, Section
by author Dec. 27, 1990). Author Camille Paglia described the video as "an eerie, sultry tableau of jaded
androgynous creatures, trapped in a decadent sexual underground. Its hypnotic images are drawn from such
sado-masochistic films as Lililana Cazani's 'The Night Porter' and Luchino Visconti's 'The Damned.' It's
the perverse and knowing world of the photographers Helmut Newton and Robert Mapplethorpe." See
Camille Paglia, Madonna - Finally, A Real Feminist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at A39. Paglia noted that
Madonna "exposes the puritanism and suffocating ideology of American feminism, which is stuck in an
adolescent, whining mode." Id.
7 BRET E. ELLIS, AMERICAN PSYCHO (1991). In January 1990, Simon & Schuster bought the rights to
Bret Easton Ellis' novel American Psycho, with release scheduled for winter, 1990-91. On October 29, 1990,
Time magazine published an "excerpt" describing a woman being skinned alive and on November 14, 1990,
Simon & Schuster abruptly canceled Ellis' novel one month before its scheduled release. Ellis kept his
$300,000 advance from Simon & Schuster. On November 15, 1990, Vintage Books, a trade paperback
division of Random House, agreed to publish the novel. See An "American Psycho" Drama, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1990, at El. The controversy over Ellis' novel began after passages of the book - about a young,
successful, Wall Street businessman - were leaked to the press. According to one account, Patrick Bateman,
the book's aptly-named protagonist, in "[w]hat might be the book's single most disturbing passage," engages
in sexual torture of one of his former girlfriends: "In the scene, Bateman nails her hands to the floor, cuts
out her tongue and then forces her to perform an act of oral sex, before killing her." See Richard Bernstein,
"American Psycho," Going So Far That Many Say It's Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, at C13. Ellis
has responded that "[tihe book is 400 pages long, and there are less than 40 pages with the type of mayhem
they quote .... The articles make it seem like they're a disproportionate amount of the book." The 26-year-
old Ellis wrote the best-selling and critically acclaimed LESS THAN ZERO, published by Simon & Schuster.
See David Streitfeld, Publisher Cancels Lurid Novel, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 1990, at Cl.
8 See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 205-06 (1986) (arguing that
pornography "certainly is communicative expression" whose aim and effect is to cultivate and stimulate
sexual imagination); Gey, supra note 2, at 1631 (noting that sexual speech often serves as vehicle for anti-
authoritarianism ideas that the First Amendment arguably must protect). Professor David A.J. Richards
notes that "hard-core pornographic" material is the "natural communicative vehicle" for the "erotic
imaginative life" that free speech principles must protect so that free persons can exercise their powers of
imagination over "issues central to finding value in life." See David A. J. Richards, A New Paradigm for
Free Speech Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 283 (1990).
9 See Gey, supra note 2, at 1633 (noting that proponents of censorship never will achieve a world that
will satisfy proponents of censorship); see also Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 395 (1963) (arguing that obscenity basically is not crime, but is sin).
One scholar questions the integrity of permitting states to regulate in areas of the law such as abortion that
profoundly affect personal constitutional freedom. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 184-86 (1986)
(discussing "Integrity and the Constitution"). Professor Dworkin questions whether a state legislature that
dictates the extent to which persons may exercise abortion rights acts consistently with an American
constitutional scheme that makes important rights national in scope and enforcement, Id. at 186. Arguably,
Professor Dworkin's analysis of abortion rights equally applies to obscenity law, which implicates the First
Amendment rights of both distributors and consumers.
10 See infra notes 15-66 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 67-94 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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IV suggests procedural safeguards that would help juries reach more informed decisions
in such cases, and would help appellate judges engage in meaningful independent
review. 3 Section V proposes a three-stage test that protects all materials that have
serious intellectual value, and incorporates a constitutionally required standard of tolerance
that addresses the "explicit harm" of allegedly obscene material. 4
II. A HISTORY OF OBSCENITY LAW: THE INFLUENCE OF MILLER AND POPE
A. Preserving Social Order and Morality: The Emergence of "Community Standards"
English and American courts, in establishing the earliest tests for "obscenity,"
expressed concern for social order and morality by taking into account different
community standards. 5 In 1868, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, an English jurist,
formulated a test for obscenity. 16 Under Justice Cockburn's test, material was obscene
if the material tended to deprave and corrupt particularly susceptible individuals who
might gain access to the material. 7 In 1913, Federal District Judge Learned Hand
suggested that government should regulate obscenity only by reference to a community
standard that changes with the times, not by the Victorian moral standard that the deprave
and corrupt test required. 8 In addition, Judge Hand expressed that an obscenity test
should not focus on the weakest or most corruptible persons in society, as the deprave and
corrupt test did, but instead should focus on persons of average conscience.' 9In 1957, the United States Supreme Court formulated the Court's initial test for
obscenity in Roth v. United States.2° The Court in Roth held that the First Amendment
does not protect obscene expression.2' In determining that the law can punish obscenity,
the Court reasoned that society's interest in order and morality outweighs the minimal
social value of obscene expression.22 The Court in Roth determined that material is
obscene if an average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
that the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in
13 See infra notes 95, 106-135 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (proposing "explicit harm" standard); infra notes
143-62 and accompanying text (discussing proposed three-stage test for obscenity); infra notes 163-71 and
accompanying text (discussing benefits of proposed three-stage test).
15 See generally United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-
Q.B. 360 (1868).
16 Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371.
17 Id.
18 Kennerley, 209 F. at 120-21.
19 Id.
20 354 U.S. 476 (1957), overruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85.
22 Id. at 485 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). But see Pamela J.
Stevens, Note, Community Standards and Federal Obscenity Prosecutions, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 693, 703
(1982) (contending that social interest in order and morality should be constitutionally impermissible purpose
for government regulation of speech because that purpose regulates speech solely on the basis of some
persons' distaste for content of speech).
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sex.23 The Court's "contemporary community standards" test, however, did not describe
the geographic scope of the term "community.,
24
Nevertheless, the obscenity test formulated in Roth resolved three flaws that the
Court perceived in the English test for obscenity. 25 First, the Roth test required the jury
to evaluate allegedly obscene material according to the material's effect on average
persons, rather than on unusually sensitive persons.26 Second, the Roth test required that
the jury evaluate allegedly obscene material according to present-day community standards
rather than obsolete moral standards 7.2  Third, the Roth test did not focus on the effect
of isolated portions of a work, but on the effect of the entire work.28
23 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Supreme Court has noted that the Roth test equated obscenity with
"prurience" - material that appeals to a "shameful or morbid" interest in sex rather than to a "good, old
fashioned, healthy" interest in sex. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 497-99, 504 (1985).
24 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-90 (discussing community standards test); see also FREDERICK F.
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 117 (1976) [hereinafter SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY] (noting
Court's failure in Roth to define explicitly the term "community" in contemporary community standards
test); Gregory L. Waples & Mary Jo White, Choice of Community Standards in Federal Obscenity Proceed-
ings: The Role of the Constitution and the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REV. 399, 400 (1978) (noting Court's
failure to explain the scope of contemporary community standards in Roth); Lorri Staal, Note, The Objective
Standard for Social Value in Obscenity Cases, 78 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735, 738 (1988) (same).
Some commentators have reasoned that because the Court in Roth upheld the trial judge's jury
instructions that deemed the jurors exclusive judges of the common conscience of the community, the Court
intended that jurors, in making obscenity determinations, apply standards of the local community. See
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra, at 117 (discussing Court's concept of "community"); Staal,
supra, at 738 (same). Further, some commentators have presumed that, because of the judge's instruction
that deemed the jurors exclusive judges of the community's "conscience," the jury in Roth applied localized
standards in determining what the common conscience of the community was. See SCHAUER, THE LAW OF
OBSCENITY, supra, at 117 (discussing standards that the jury in Roth applied); Staal, supra, at 738 (same).
Another scholar, however, has argued that the Supreme Court in Roth intended that the contemporary
community standard represent the society's current prevailing opinion, without reference to any specific
community. See HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 38 (1969) (discussing Court's
"contemporary community standards" requirement in obscenity cases). Similarly, some commentators have
noted that the broad tone of the Court's opinion in Roth indicated that the standard would change through
time, rather than differ geographically at any given time. See William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 110 (1960) (noting
that Court used phrase "contemporary community standards" to disapprove of jurors' application of Victorian
standards in obscenity cases); Frederick F. Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards":
The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. L. REV. 1, 8 (1978) (noting
Court's temporal rather than geographical emphasis on contemporary community standards).
25 See 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 172-73
(1985) (discussing three flaws in the Hicklin test for obscenity).
26 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89; see FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 173 (discussing Hicklin test's focus on
especially susceptible persons).
27 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 (citing Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)); see FEINBERG,
supra note 25, at 173 (discussing Hicklin test's application of eternally fixed Victorian upper class standards
to works).
28 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489; see FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 173 (discussing Hicklin test in which jurors
evaluated isolated passages of works). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 906
n. 17 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that Hicklin does not advocate obscenity test based on "isolated passages" of
given work). Scholars generally view the Roth standard as making obscenity law more liberal than the
obscenity law prior to Roth. See FEINBERG, supra, at 173 (noting that Roth test for obscenity was a distinct
improvement over Hicklin test); Gey, supra note 2, at 1571 (analyzing liberal effect of Roth decision on
obscenity law); Riggs, supra note 2, at 249 (noting that Roth decision effectively stimulated publishers'
production and distribution of sexually explicit materials).
19921
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After the Supreme Court established a test for obscenity, Congress and most state
legislatures enacted criminal statutes that punish obscene expression.29 Accordingly, the
question of whether the First Amendment protects sexually explicit materials can turn on
a jury's often complicated determination, under a legislature's statute, of whether the
materials are obscene.3" In obscenity cases, community standards have emerged as the
primary criteria for determining whether certain sexually explicit materials are obscene
and thus are denied constitutional protection from criminal sanctions.3'
B. "National" Community Standards for Obscenity: A Good Idea that Commanded
Only a Plurality of the Court
During the early 1960's, in an effort to clarify the decision in Roth, a plurality
of the Supreme Court endorsed a uniform, national standard for obscenity determinations
in several opinions. In 1962, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Manual Enterprises v.
Day32 clarified the scope of the term "community" in the phrase "contemporary
community standards" that the Court introduced in Roth.33 The plurality in Manual
Enterprises determined that national standards of decency governed federal obscenity
cases.34 The Court reasoned that if an obscenity standard denied certain areas of the
country access to material that is acceptable in other areas, the standard would intolerably
affect the public's right of access to sexually explicit material.35 The Court, therefore,
determined that in federal obscenity cases, the relevant community was the United States
rather than any state, county, or city. 3
6
Two years after the Manual Enterprises decision, a plurality of the Court in
Jacobellis v. Ohio" further clarified the scope of the term "community" in the phrase
"contemporary community standards. 3 In Jacobellis the plurality stated that jurors must
evaluate the obscenity of materials by reference to societal standards rather than local or
29 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988) (punishing persons who mail obscene matter); ALA. CODE §
13A-12-151 (1987) (prohibiting distribution and manufacture of obscene works); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-68-
405 (Michie 1987) (punishing possession, sale, or distribution of obscene material); FLA. STAT. ch. 847.06
(1987) (punishing transportation of obscene materials into state); IDAHO CODE § 18-4103 (1988) (punishing
sale or distribution of obscene matter); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.020 (Baldwin 1988) (punishing
distribution of obscene matter); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418 (1987) (punishing sale, distribution, or
publication of obscene matter); MINN. STAT. § 617.241 (1987) (punishing distribution of obscene materials);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.249 (Michie 1987) (punishing production, sale, distribution, exhibition, and
possession of obscene materials); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-1 (1987) (punishing circulation of obscene
publications and shows); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374 (Michie 1988) (punishing production, publication, sale,
and possession of obscene items).
30 See generally Jamison Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: A Study of
a Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1159, 1162-75 (1986) (discussing jury's role in
obscenity determinations and advocating plain-language jury instructions). One scholar considers obscenity
one of the most intractable speech problems that the Supreme Court has faced. See SMOLLA, supra note 1,
at 189 (discussing obscenity law).
31 See Marguerite M. Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials, 15 U. MICH. JL. REF. 45, 47-
48 (1981) (describing community standards as the "heart" of obscenity test).
32 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
33 Id. at 488.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 488 & n.10.
37 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
38 Id. at 192-93.
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state community standards.39 Moreover, the plurality determined that Roth indeed had
required a national standard for all obscenity cases,4" reasoning that the First Amendment
does not vary with state, county, or municipal lines, but is national in application.4 The
Jacobellis decision thus reaffirmed that the Constitution required a national standard for
obscenity determinations. 2
C. Miller v. California: The Tension Between "Community Standards" of Tolerance
and "Serious Value" of Material
The Supreme Court set forth the current three-part obscenity test in Miller v.
California.43 In Miller, the State of California, under a California statute, convicted the,
defendant for knowingly distributing obscene materials.' The Superior Court of
California summarily affirmed the conviction, rejecting the defendant's claim that the jury
violated the First Amendment by applying state rather than national standards.45 After
the appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court formulated a test in which
material, to be obscene, must satisfy three prongs.46 The first prong requires that an
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex ("prurient interest prong").47 The
second prong requires that, according to contemporary community standards, the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as defined by state law
("patent offensiveness prong"). 4 8 The third prong requires that the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value ("serious value prong"). 9
39 Id.
40 Id. at 195.
41 Id. at 194-95.
42 Id. Chief Justice Earl Warren, however, expressed in his Jacobellis dissent that no national standard
for obscenity existed. Id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, the Chief Justice proposed that state
and lower federal courts evaluate allegedly obscene material with reference to local community standards. Id.
43 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
44 Id. at 16. In Miller, the obscene matter consisted of five brochures that advertised a film, "Marital
Intercourse," and four books: "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and "An Illustrated
History of Pornography." Id. at 18. The brochures depicted, through pictures and drawings, men and
women in groups of two or more engaged in various sexual activities. Id. The brochures often prominently
displayed the genitals of the men and women. Id.
45 Id. at 17.
46 Id. at 24; see infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (describing three-prong Miller test).
47 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
48 ld.; see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (noting that juries must apply
contemporary community standards to the patent offensiveness prong of the Miller test).
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The third prong in Miller, which inquired whether allegedly obscene
material lacked serious intellectual value, was a distinct change from the third prong in the obscenity test
that the Court endorsed in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion). The
third Memoirs prong required that, to declare material obscene, a jury find the material "utterly without
redeeming social value." Id. Further, the third Memoirs prong had made the Court's obscenity standard
significantly more permissive, because the "utterly without" prong required the prosecution in an obscenity
case to prove a negative. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (discussing third prong of Memoirs obscenity test).
Indeed, the Court in Miller exlicitly disapproved of the permissive effect of the third Memoirs prong. Id.
Accordingly, one scholar.views the Miller standard as an effort by the Supreme Court to restrict the use of
sexually explicit materials as a vehicle for.free expression. See FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 186 (noting that
intended consequence of the Miller decision was to permit more aggressive prosecutions of pornographers).
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The Supreme Court explained that the jury could measure the prurient appeal and
patent offensiveness prongs by community standards rather than national standards. 50 The
Court reasoned that the issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness essentially are
questions of fact and, because of the diversity and size of the United States, the Court
could not formulate a single, national standard to determine whether a work appeals to
prurient interest or is patently offensive.5 Accordingly, the Court rejected a requirement
that juries apply a national standard to the first two prongs of the obscenity test.52 The
Court, however, did not state what geographic standard a jury must apply in assessing the
obscenity test's serious value prong.53
50 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. The Court upheld the trial court's instruction that the jury, in evaluating the
allegedly obscene material, apply a statewide community standard. Id. at 33-34. The Court in Miller noted
that the primary purpose of the contemporary community standards requirement in Roth was to avoid the
dangers of the Hicklin "deprave and corrupt" obscenity test that focused on particularly susceptible
individuals. Id.; see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing Roth decision); supra notes 16-17
and accompanying text (discussing Hicklin test for obscenity). The Court in Miller determined that the jury
instruction adequately ensured that the jury would judge the allegedly obscene material by the material's
impact on an average person, rather than the material's effect on a particularly susceptible, particularly
sensitive, or totally insensitive person. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
51 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. Four years after the Supreme Court's decision in Miller, Justice Stevens
discussed at length the illogic of the Court's geographic premise in Miller that a national standard for
obscenity cases would be futile for juries to apply. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 314 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that jury could not ascertain contemporary community standards in
California, a large and culturally diverse state, more accurately than jury could ascertain national standards);
see also SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra note 24, at 125 (noting that in states such as New York,
California, and Texas, statewide standards are not more ascertainable than national standards); Harry M.
Clor, Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 207, 215 (1974) (discussing
diversity in standards between New York City and upstate New York). Justice Stevens argued further that
the standard for some metropolitan areas would be no more ascertainable than a national standard. Smith,
431 U.S. at 314 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because state and local community standards are no more
ascertainable than national standards for obscenity, the logic of the Court in Miller would dictate that a
jury's attempt to apply any particular community standard is futile. See id. at 312-15 (discussing Justice
Stevens' view of Miller "community standards" test).
52 Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.
53 See id. at 30 (failing to describe geographic standard that juries must apply to serious value prong);
Staal, supra note 24, at 743 (noting that the Court, in discussing "serious value" prong, failed to mention
geographic standards). In 1974, the Supreme Court clarified the Miller holding to mean that the Constitution
did not require any specific geographic standard in either federal or state obscenity cases. See Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (holding that states can define the phrase "contemporary community
standards" without further geographic specification); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)
(holding that courts in federal obscenity cases could define the phrase "contemporary community standards"
without further geographic specification). One scholar noted that the Court, by failing to require that juries
utilize any specific geographic community standard in evaluating allegedly obscene materials, confirmed the
fears of persons who oppose censorship. See FELICE F. LEWIS, LITERATURE, OBSCENITY, AND LAW 242
(1976) (discussing Supreme Court's failure to require any specific geographic standard in obscenity cases)
(quoting Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 157). After Jenkins and Hamling, prosecutors could subject publishers to
innumerable lawsuits unless the most restrictive communities in the United States would find the publishers'
materials acceptable. Id.
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D. Pope v. Illinois: "Serious Value" Revisited: Enter the "Reasonable Person"
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court determined in Pope v. Illinois54 the
standard a jury must apply in judging the obscenity test's serious value prong.55 In Pope,
the State of Illinois separately charged the defendants, both of whom were attendants at
an adult bookstore, with violating Illinois obscenity law by selling adult magazines.56
The defendants in Pope moved to dismiss the obscenity charges on the ground that the
Illinois obscenity statute was unconstitutional because the statute failed to require that the
jury judge the materials' value solely on an objective basis rather than by contemporary
community standards.57 The juries convicted both defendants,58 and the Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed the judgment.59 The defendants subsequently appealed to the
United States Supreme Court and renewed their claim that the Illinois obscenity statute
was unconstitutional. 60 Reversing in part the lower court's decision, the Supreme CoUrt
held that the jury, when determining the value of allegedly obscene materials, must apply
an objective reasonable person standard. 6'
The Supreme Court in Pope reasoned that because the value of sexually explicit
material does not vary from community to community based on the degree of local
acceptance that the material has won, the serious value of a work, as a matter of
54 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
55 Id. at 500;. see infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing Court's determination of the
standards that juries must apply to serious value prong). In Pope, the Court noted that the Court in Miller
intentionally did not discuss the third prong of the Miller test in terms of contemporary community
standards. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500.
56 Pope, 481 U.S. at 499.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 499-500. In Pope, both trial courts rejected the defendants' contention that the Illinois
obscenity statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 500. Further, the trial courts instructed the respective juries to
determine the "value" prong with reference to how ordinary adults in the entire state of Illinois would view
the materials' value. Id. at 499 n. 1. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Illinois
Supreme Court denied review. Id.
59 Id. at 500.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 500-01; see id. at 504 (characterizing Court's "reasonable person" standard as an "objective
standard") (Scalia, J., concurring); Staal, supra note 24, at 735 (interpreting reasonable person standard,
which is the Court's requirement in Pope for serious value prong, as an objective standard). The Court
noted that jurors can apply contemporary community standards only to the first two prongs of the Miller test.
Pope, 481 U.S. at 500. The Court determined that the trial courts' jury instruction was unconstitutional; the
proper inquiry for a jury in determining serious value is whether a reasonable person, rather than an ordinary
member of a given community, would find certain types of intellectual value in allegedly obscene material
taken as a whole. Id. at 500-01; see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing Court's rationale
in Pope). Notably, while the defendants pursued their appeals in the United States Supreme Court, the
Illinois legislature repealed the obscenity statute under which the jury convicted the defendants in Pope, and
enacted a new statute that did not require juries to apply contemporary community standards to the third
Miller prong. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1 1-20(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (effective Jan. 1, 1986)
(Illinois obscenity statute).
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constitutional law, must be constant throughout the United States.62 The Court further
reasoned that if a judge instructed jurors assessing the serious value of allegedly obscene
material to apply community standards, jurors might feel bound to apply prevailing local
values without considering whether local values were reasonable. 63 The Court deter-
mined, therefore, that under the Pope standard a jury cannot find material obscene if a
reasonable person would find serious value in the material, even though only a minority
of persons in a given community might find serious value in the material.6 Comparing
the reasonable person requirement for the serious value prong to the "reasonable man"
instructions that apply in other contexts, such as tort suits, the Supreme Court determined
that the reasonable person standard would not unduly confuse the trier of fact.65 The
Court, therefore, established a standard that juries, in assessing serious value of allegedly
-obscene material, must apply without reference to contemporary community standards. 6
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S MILLER-POPE OBSCENITY TEST
A. "Community Standards" of Tolerance - The Court Injects Taste Into the First
Amendment
The Supreme Court in Miller approved a contemporary community standard for
sexually explicit expression that could vary depending on a state's or town's distaste for
the material. 67 Because the Miller standard permitted juries to utilize a statewide or local
community standard for the prurient appeal and patent offensiveness prongs, local courts
could convict persons for distributing sexually explicit material that more permissive
jurisdictions might not find obscene. 68 For national publishers who distributed materials
that lacked serious value, the Miller test created a risk of criminal liability unless materials
met the most austere standards in the country. 69
In rejecting a requirement of a national standard for the prurient appeal and
patent offensiveness prongs, the Supreme Court's opinion ,in Miller indicated that an
62 Pope, 481 U.S. at 500; see Gey, supra note 2, at 1580 (noting that third prong of Pope test requires
a national standard for jury's determination of the intellectual value of allegedly obscene materials).
Professor Gey noted, however, that the Court in Pope, in determining that "serious value" of a work is a
matter of constitutional law that is consistent nationwide, merely reiterated the common understanding that
the serious value question required a uniform constitutional standard. Id.
63 Pope, 481 U.S. at 501 n.3.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 500-01 & n.3.
67 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1974) (discussing contemporary community standards
test); infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing standard for sexually explicit expression that the
Court established in Miller).
68 See Miller, *413 U.S. at 30-34 (discussing propriety of state and local community standards of
tolerance for sexually explicit materials in the Miller test); FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 186 (noting that
Miller effectively permitted local courts to convict distributors of sexually explicit materials that "more
sophisticated" jurisdictions might not find obscene).
69 See FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 186 (discussing adverse effects of Miller decision on free
expression); BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 295 (Avon ed. 1981) (noting that
lower court judges repeatedly would abuse or misread obscenity law); see also CLOR, supra note 24, at 74
(noting that jurors' application of local community standards likely would result in censorship of genuinely
valuable materials); Richard E. Shugrue, An Atlas for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7
CREIGHTON L. REV. 157, 159 (1974) (noting that righteous prosecutors conceivably may seek to impose
personal morality on society).
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obscenity standard should not require that persons in certain parts of the nation accept
sexually explicit material that persons in other parts of the nation tolerate.7 ° The Court
thus rejected a national standard of tolerance for sexually explicit materials that the Court
had recognized in obscenity cases prior to Miller.7 One commentator has suggested that
70 Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. Professor Gey has noted that the Court's approach was internally
contradictory. Gey, supra note 2, at 1579. Professor Gey reasoned that the Court intended that the
standards of "corrupt" urbanites of Manhattan no longer would define the constitutional obscenity standard
for the rest of the country. Id. Professor Gey concluded, accordingly, that because intellectual merit would
"salvage" material from an obscenity determination even if most Americans considered the material sexually
debasing, the Miller serious value prong did not express the Court's intent. Id.
71 Miller, 413 U.S. at 37; see FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 186 (noting that Miller decision "tightened
the screws" on obscenity); Gey, supra note 2, at 1578 (noting that the Court, in defining a new obscenity
test, relied primarily upon Justices' visceral valuations of obscene expression); Waples & White, supra note
24, at 446 (noting that the Court's rejection in Millet of a national standard weakened First Amendment
protection of sexually explicit materials); supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing national
standards that the Court endorsed prior to Miller).
Courts disagree whether the Court's community standards requirement from Miller measures a
community's affirmative acceptance of allegedly obscene material, versus a community's tolerance for (but
not necessarily acceptance of) the material. Compare United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 759 (4th Cir.
1990) (noting that a "tolerance" test for community standards would "affront ... the notion of 'standards,'
because tolerance embodies the permissible deviations from standards") (quoting Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d
740, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 305 (1990) with Red Bluff
Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1029 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) ("[T]he line between protected
expression and punishable obscenity must be drawn at the limits of a community's tolerance rather than in
accordance with the dangerous standards of propriety and taste"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982). The
Court's decision in Miller does not mention "acceptance" or "toleration" in discussing contemporary
community standards. Pryba, 900 F.2d at 759. However, the Court's decision in Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291 (1977), suggests that the Miller test might indeed require-that the jury determine the tolerance
of the community for allegedly obscene material. See id. at 305 ("[C]ommunity standards must be applied
by juries in accordance with their own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their
community") (emphasis added).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Millet, the Court indicated that contemporary community
standards embodied society's tolerance for allegedly obscene materials. See Manual Enters. v. Day, 370
U.S. 478, 489 (1962) (finding material which did not violate contemporary notions of fundamental decency
to be non-obscene); id. at 490 (finding sexually explicit portrayals, which did not exceed portrayals that
"society tolerates," to be non-obscene); CLOR, supra note 24, at 62 (analyzing Manual Enterprises standard
as "outer limits of tolerance" standard). The Supreme Court in Manual Enterprises sought to ensure that no
nationwide "patchwork" of divergent ethnic and cultural standards would result in unequal nationwide access
to sexually explicit materials. See Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 488 (noting "intolerable consequence"
that occurs if some sections of the United States do not have access to material that those sections find
acceptable, simply because other sections of the United States might find same materials offensive to
prevailing community standards of decency); Staal, supra note 24, at 738 (noting "patchwork" of community
standards that would result if local communities enacted obscenity laws). Indeed, some commentators have
supported the national standard of tolerance for sexually. explicit materials that the Court advocated in
Manual Enterprises, rather than an obscenity standard that requires community acceptance to gain First
Amendment protection for material. See Michael K. Curtis, Obscenity: The Justices' (Not So) New Robes, 8
CAMPBELL L. REV. 387, 410 (1986) (advocating standard of tolerance for obscenity determinations); see also
CLOR, supra, at 56 (suggesting interpretation of "contemporary community standards" as community's outer
limits of tolerance rather than community's present moral standards). Professor Clor implies that a
community could tolerate sexually explicit materials while at the same time disapproving of the materials.
See id. (noting that community may tolerate many things of which the community disapproves).
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code obscenity standard encompasses society's
tolerance for sexually explicit materials. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(4)(d) (Official Draft 1962)
(declaring, as admissible evidence, degree of public acceptance of allegedly obscene material in the United
States). Similarly, both Canada's and West Germany's current obscenity law espouse a national or societal
standard of tolerance toward sexually explicit communication. See Cynthia A. MacDougall, The Community
Standards Test of Obscenity, 42 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 79, 83 (1984) (noting that Canada's obscenity
standard, which is national in scope, involves factfinder's determination of whether allegedly obscene
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in Miller, the Court intended to allow freedom of expression in various regions of the
country to flourish according to differing community standards. 72 The Court, however,
by revising the permissible geographic scope of contemporary community standards to
include statewide or local community standards, effectively fostered local censorship.
73
After the Court in Miller rejected a national standard of tolerance for sexually
explicit materials, the Court subsequently clarified which community members' views
comprise the community standard.74 In clarifying the breadth of the community that
jurors must consider, the Court determined that jurors must not take account of children
when analyzing the relevant community. 75 Furthermore, it held that jurors, in determining
community standards, must take into consideration the views of sensitive persons and
members of atypical "deviant" groups.7 6 The Court reasoned that a jury's inclusion of
both atypical group members and sensitive adults would broaden the community standard,
material exceeds community's tolerance); Kathleen E. Mahoney, Obscenity, Morals and the Law: A Feminist
Critique, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 33, 64 (1984) (discussing Canada's obscenity standard that establishes
tolerance for sexually explicit materials); Mathias Reimann, Prurient Interest and Human Dignity:
Pornography Regulation in West Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 212-18 (1987-
88) (discussing West German criminal law that establishes tolerance toward sexually explicit materials); id.
at 225 (noting that West Germany's obscenity test takes into account "general social value judgments").
72 See FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 187 (quoting Willard Gaylin). Willard Gaylin noted that the Court
in Miller intended to permit local communities to set their own standards for obscenity cases, and thus allow
diversity to flourish as people of each area wished. Id. (quoting Gaylin, "Obscenity," WASHINGTON POST,
Feb. 20, 1977). Gaylin maintained, however, that Miller effectively set limits for national distribution for
literature and television at the level of the "bluest-nosed small town critic." Id.; see supra notes 67-71 and
infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing how Supreme Court's decision in Miller encouraged local
censorship).
73 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34 (rejecting "national" community standard of tolerance for sexually
explicit materials and advocating statewide or local community standards for jury's obscenity determina-
tions); FEINBERG, supra note 24, at 186 (noting that intended consequence of the Miller decision was to
permit more aggressive prosecutions of pornographers); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 295
(noting that Miller obscenity test effectively would create "at least fifty separate First Amendments"); Riggs,
supra note 2, at 267 (noting that Miller decision broadened the range of unprotected sexually explicit
materials); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 192 (Vintage ed. 1983) (noting that "[t]o
advocate censorship is to choose not to be able to choose at all"); Curtis, supra note 71, at 387 (noting that
censorship is more dangerous than expression, even though much speech advocates repugnant values). The
Miller decision permitted effective local censorship not only in theory, but in practice as well. See
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra, at 300 (noting prosecution in Charlottesville, Virginia, of the seller of
Playboy magazine, and Chief Justice Burger's view that the Miller decision never intended to ban Playboy).
74 See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297-304 (1978) (clarifying demographic composition of
"community" in contemporary community standards test); infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's clarification of composition of "community" that reinforced local community
censorship of sexually explicit materials); supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing less
permissive standard of tolerance for sexually explicit materials that the Court established in Miller).
75 Pinkus, 436 U.S. at 298. In holding that jurors should not consider children when determining the
demographic composition of "community," the Court reasoned in Pinkus that if children were included, the
"average person" by whose standards jurors judge obscenity would be much more susceptible or sensitive
than if jurors restricted the composition of the "community" to adult viewers. Id. The Court in Pinkus
suggested that if jurors permissibly could include children in the community when determining community
standards, obscenity law might "reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children." Id.
(quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
76 Id. at 300-03. The Court, in determining that jurors may include sensitive persons in comprising
the "community," noted that jurors in obscenity cases must not focus only on the most sensitive or
insensitive persons, but must include both sensitive and insensitive persons together with all other adults in
the community. Id. at 300-01. Similarly, the Court, in ruling that jurors may include deviant persons in the
"community" when ascertaining the prurient appeal of material, reasoned that although certain materials
might appeal more to the prurient interest of "deviants," the same materials equally could appeal to the
prurient interest of any adult observer. Id. at 302.
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so that the jury more accurately could determine the views of a hypothetical "average
person."77 Unlike the inclusion of sensitive adults, however, the inclusion of deviant
group members cannot significantly impact the jury's formulation of the community
standard because the concept of a deviant group implies that the group contains a very
small number of individuals.78 As a result of permitting the jury to include sensitive
adults in formulating the community standard, the Supreme Court's definition of
"community" thus reinforced the less tolerant community standards that the Court
approved in Miller for a jury's determinations of patent offensiveness and prurient appeal
of sexually explicit materials.7 9
B. "Serious Value" - The Court's National Standard for Free Expression
The Supreme Court in Pope clarified the standards that jurors must apply to the
serious value prong of the Miller test. In the Pope test, jurors must apply an objective,
"reasonable person" standard when they judge the value of allegedly obscene materials."0
In contrast to the serious value question, a jury can apply a local or state "contemporary
community" standard when evaluating the patent offensiveness and prurient appeal of the
same material.8 Accordingly, for the serious value prong, the Supreme Court assumed
a generic, arguably national, community of "reasonable persons" who have objective
standards.82 Legislatures and judges, therefore, cannot dictate the scope of the relevant
community for the serious value prong.83 As a matter of constitutional law, the
contemporary community standard for the value of a specific work must be the same
throughout the United States.84
77 Id. at 300-02.
78 See Kai Erikson, Introduction to Wayward Puritans, in BEFORE THE LAW 423 (4th ed. 1989)
(noting that deviant individuals violate rules of conduct that the rest of the community holds in high esteem).
79 See Pinkus, 436 U.S. at 300 (noting that jurors in obscenity cases can include most susceptible or
sensitive members in the community along with all other community members); supra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Court's less tolerant standard for sexually explicit expression in Miller).
80 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1983) (requiring "reasonable person" standard for
serious value prong of obscenity test); id. at 504 (classifying Court's reasonable person test for third Miller
prong as "objective" test) (Scalia, J., concurring); Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-Core Pornography: A Proposal for
a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 255, 267 (1987-88) (interpreting Pope decision to require an objective
standard for serious value prong).
81 Pope, 481 U.S. at 500. By requiring that jurors utilize an objective, reasonable person standard
when they assess the constitutional value of materials, the Supreme Court in Pope retreated from the Miller
determination that a uniform, national standard is nonexistent. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30
(1973) (expressing that no community standard could encompass all fifty states in single formulation). Pope
specifically referred only to the first two prongs of the Miller standard in the Court's discussion of the
impropriety of national standards. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500 (discussing prurient interest and patent
offensiveness prongs of obscenity standard). Other language in Miller, however, indicates that the Court felt
that no national standard should exist for the serious value prong. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (acknowledg-
ing that because people in different states vary in their tastes and attitudes, uniform standards for obscenity
impermissibly would disturb states' diversity).
82 Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01; see supra note 81 (discussing objective nature of serious .value prong);
Gey, supra note 2, at 1580 (characterizing serious value prong of Pope standard as a national standard);
Staal, supra note 24, at 755 (interpreting Pope to require that jurors assess the value of allegedly obscene
material based on how the "average American" would evaluate material).
83 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 499-501 (holding, as unconstitutional, judge's instruction that the jury assess
the value of allegedly obscene material by determining how ordinary adults in the entire state would view
material); id. at 501-02 (suggesting that obscenity statute, which required jury to apply community standards
to value question, was invalid).
84 Id., 481 U.S. at 500-01.
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In Pope, the Supreme Court explained its reasoning that a "reasonable person"
standard was the appropriate way for juries to determine whether material has constitu-
tionally protected value. The Court distinguished between the concept of a reasonable
person who evaluates allegedly obscene material and an ordinary member of any specific
community who judges the same material. s5 The Court in Pope noted that even though
only a small minority of persons might find serious value in certain sexually explicit
materials, those persons might indeed be reasonable.86 Therefore, by endeavoring to
protect minority views regarding serious value of sexually explicit material, the Court
approved a national standard for serious value in Pope that it had rejected in Miller
regarding the prurient appeal and patent offensiveness of material. 7
In distinguishing the serious value prong from the prurient interest and patent
offensiveness prongs, and requiring an objective "reasonable person" standard for serious
value, the Court in Pope stated that the constitutional value of a work cannot change from
community to community.8 However, for the Court's reasonable person standard to
bring about a truly uniform standard for serious value, a "reasonable person" by definition
always would recognize whether allegedly obscene material has serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 9 The Court ignores the possibility that the term "reasonable
person" will confuse the jury,9 ° convinced that the jury can distinguish between its use
here and in other legal contexts, such as tort suits. 91 Jurors can more easily agree on
85 Id. But see PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 90-91 (1965) (explaining role of
"reasonable man" concept in law). Notably, Lord Patrick Devlin considered an "ordinary person" and a
"reasonable man" to be the same entity. Id. at 90. The Supreme Court's distinction in Pope between an
ordinary member of any given community and a reasonable person, therefore, is inconsistent with Devlin's
position that an "ordinary" person who ascertains moral principles after lawyers' arguments, a judge's
instructions, and jury deliberations is a "reasonable" person. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01 (distinguishing
between "ordinary person" and "reasonable person" who evaluates allegedly obscene material). Accordingly,
Devlin's explanation of the "reasonable man" would suggest that the Court, in justifying a "reasonable
person" standard for the serious value prong, relies upon a meaningless distinction.
86 Pope, 481 U.S. at 501 n,3. But see Donald E. Montgomery, Note, Obscenity: 30 Years of
Confusion and Still Counting, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 379, 402 (1987) (noting that reasonable person
standard, as "mean" of population, contradicts theory that minority views can prevail regarding serious value
of sexually explicit material) (citing Pope, 481 U.S. at 511-12 n.4).
87 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01 (requiring national constitutional standard for serious value); Miller,
413 U.S. at 30 (rejecting national standard of tolerance for prurient appeal and patent offensiveness prongs
of obscenity standard). Compare supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
Pope decision, which established an objective standard for serious value of sexually explicit materials) with
supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court's Miller decision, which rejected
national standards of tolerance for prurient appeal and patent offensiveness of sexually explicit materials).
88 Pope, 481 U.S. at 500. But see William B. Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty:
Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 555-56 (1975) (interpreting serious value prong
of Miller standard as merely representative of First Amendment values, requiring jury's subjective
judgment).
89 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01 (discussing reasonable person standard for serious value prong of
obscenity test); supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's distinction between
ordinary member of community and "reasonable person" who determines whether material has serious
value).
90 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 501 n.3 (noting that reasonable person standard for serious value prong will
not confuse jurors); MacDougall, supra note 71, at 84 (noting differences between "reasonable man" of
negligence law and community standards tests generally); Taylor, supra note 80, at 281 (noting that current
obscenity standard results in "undeniable confusion" for jurors).
91 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 501 n.3 (stating that reasonable person standard for serious value prong will
not confuse jurors). But see Lentz, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that although community standards depend




whether a reasonable person would have driven a car more safely in a tort case, than
whether a reasonable person would react a certain way to allegedly obscene material.92
Furthermore, although the Court's reasonable person standard requires a uniform standard
for serious value, jurors might believe that reasonable persons can disagree about the
serious value of a sexually explicit work.93 Faced with such a reasonable person test,
juries would be more likely to resolve obscenity cases according to their personal tastes
and biases. 4
IV. MAKING "COMMUNITY STANDARDS" TESTS RELIABLE
A. Helping Juries and Judges Fulfill Their Roles
To improve obscenity law, the Supreme Court should improve the ability of
juries to ascertain community standards of tolerance that juries must apply in determining
whether material is patently offensive. Because community standards are a determinative
factor for a jury in deciding whether sexually explicit materials are obscene, the jury
should receive as much information as possible to help clarify the scope of community
standards.95 Otherwise, a jury's determination under the current obscenity standard
frustrates the ability of appellate courts and the Supreme Court to discern community
standards in deciding obscenity cases on appeal.
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.,96 a product defamation case, discussed the nature and importance of
appellate review in obscenity cases.97 The Court recognized that every obscenity case
raises an individual constitutional problem in which appellate courts must make sensitive,
92 See Gey, supra note 2, at 1580 (noting that Pope's "reasonable person" formulation erroneously
assumed that all reasonable persons consistently would resolve "serious value" question). MacDougall notes
that in a negligence action the jury determines, according to a "reasonable man" standard, what the defendant
ought to have done. MacDougall, supra note 71, at 84. In contrast, the jury in an obscenity case determines
what the community actually thinks of the allegedly obscene material. Id. Arguably, therefore, the Court's
analogy of the "reasonable person" standard in the obscenity context to tort cases was inappropriate. See
Pope, 481 U.S. at 501 n.3 (discussing "reasonable man" instructions that judges often give jurors in tort
suits).
93 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500 (noting that "serious value" of work cannot vary from community to
community); id. at 506 (noting that reasonable persons certainly may differ regarding what constitutes
literary or artistic merit) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); Gey, supra note 2, at 1580 (noting that Court's
reasonable person analysis might reduce First Amendment protection of "fringe" or "avant-garde" materials
that might not appear to most persons to have value).
See Curtis, supra note 71, at 405 (quoting juror, in obscenity trial, who felt that jury should
represent community and establish community standard); Taylor, supra note 80, at 281 (noting current
obscenity standard's "inherent weakness" that results because jurors subjectively apply obscenity test in
various local communities); Staal, supra note 24, at 761 (noting that jurors' ability successfully to apply
"reasonable person" standard to serious value prong in obscenity cases is unlikely).
95 See Lentz, supra note 31, at 57 (noting that jury's determinations of community standards "borders
on the impossible" unless jury receives specific evidence that reflects community standards); Waples &
White, supra note 24,- at 411 (noting that jurors' selection of relevant community standard may determine
obscenity issue in particular cases); Wilcox, supra note 30, at 1170 (noting unnecessary complexity and
misleading connotations that result if a court does not define "community" in obscenity cases); Glenn B.
Hotchkiss, Note, Is Expert Testimony Necessary to Obscenity Litigation? The Arizona Supreme Court
Answers - NO!, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 821, 842 (1987) (noting that whenever jurors draw standard from the
community, they must determine scope of community before jury can recognize standard).
96 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
97 Id. at 504-08.
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particularized judgments to determine whether material is obscene.98 The Court noted
that in child pornography cases, it independently may examine allegedly unprotected
material to assure that the judgment below does not unduly intrude on the field of free
expression.99 The Court in Bose recognized, therefore, that appellate courts can exercise
de novo review in obscenity cases,"' even though the prurient appeal and patent
offensiveness prongs of the Miller test are essentially questions of fact.' °1 Indeed, the
Court suggested that the Miller test's first two prongs are of such constitutional
significance that appellate courts must exercise independent, de novo review in obscenity
cases to preserve free expression."°2
When courts exercise appellate review, however, the trial record does not reflect
the actual subjective standards that the jury applied, because jurors may draw on their own
experience in determining the relevant community standard." 3 Because the trial record
does not reflect the subjective standards applied by the jury, the Supreme Court arguably
cannot apply the appropriate local or statewide community standard when exercising de
novo review."°4 Similarly, although state or federal appellate courts might have
98 Id. at 506 & n.25; see also Rodric B. Schoen, Billy Jenkins and Eternal Verities: The 1973
Obscenity Cases, 50 N.D. L. REV. 567, 584 (1974) (noting that each obscenity case raises constitutional
problem of whether the First Amendment protects allegedly obscene material).
99 Bose, 466 U.S. at 504-05.
1oo Id.
101 Id. at 506 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 & 30 (1973)).
102 Id. at 506 & n.25 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957) (opinion of Harlan,
J.) overruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)); see also FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 18 (Rutledge Hill Press ed. 1986) [hereinafter ATIORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMISSION REPORT] .(noting that close judicial scrutiny of materials that juries find obscene
ensures First Amendment protections for truly non-obscene material); David J. Paulin, Note, Obscenity Test
Requires Trier of Fact to Determine Whether "Reasonable Person" Would Find Material Lacks Serious
Value, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 478, 502 (1988) (observing that Pope decision grants appellate courts
authority to constitutionally supplement jury findings). Some commentators interpreted the Bose decision to
mean that all three prongs of the Miller standard are mixed questions of law and fact, subject to independent
appellate review. See J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483,
508 (1985) (stating that community standard is mixed question of law and fact); Susan Elkin, Note, Taking
Serious Value Seriously: Obscenity, Pope v. Illinois, and an Objective Standard, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855,
862 n.60 (1987) (interpreting Bose to suggest that all three prongs of obscenity standard are mixed questions
of law and fact).
103 See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315-16 (1977) (noting that because trial record never
discloses jurors' obscenity standards, appellate courts cannot effectively review jury decisions) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Lentz, supra note 31, at 62 (noting that if judges at trial admit no evidence of community
standards, trial record, upon appeal, will contain no indication of community norms) (citing United States v.
Cutting, 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d
577 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Wild,
422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir, 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971)).
104 See Schoen, supra note 98, at 588-89 & n.77 (questioning the Supreme Court's ability to properly
assert a better understanding of state or local community standards than citizens and judges of that state); see
also Parker, supra note 102, at 503 (noting Supreme Court's authority to review de novo jury decisions that
restrict free expression). In 1974, the Supreme Court independently examined Carnal Knowledge and
reversed a state jury's determination that the film was obscene because the Court found that the film was not
patently offensive. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974). The Court reversed the jury's determina-
tion that the film was obscene despite the jury's general verdict of guilty. Id. at 156; see also Parker, supra
note 102 at 506 (noting that Jenkins stands for proposition that appellate courts should disturb jury verdicts
to vindicate First Amendment rights). When the Court reviewed the jury's decision on the patent offensive-
ness prong of the Miller test, which the Court stated essentially is a question of fact, the Court exercised de
novo review. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163 (noting that Jenkins decision leaves no doubt that Miller requires
reviewing courts independently to review obscenity determinations) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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knowledge of a statewide standard in making de novo evaluations, appellate courts
arguably cannot apply local standards, because the trial record does not preserve for
appellate review the jury's subjective standards.' °5 If the Supreme Court continues to
require that juries apply contemporary community standards of tolerance for the first two
Miller prongs, the Court also should require that trial courts admit and preserve in the trial
record evidence of the community standards for the patent offensiveness and prurient
appeal prongs of the Miller test."°6 The Court, therefore, no longer would require juries
to apply standards that appellate courts cannot discern upon independent, de novo review.
B. Requiring Prosecution's Affirmative Evidence of Community Standards and
Requiring Admission of Defense's Expert Testimony
One procedure that would make the Pope standard more accurate is a
requirement that the piosecution present evidence of community standards as part of its
prima facie case. The Supreme Court has held that the prosecution need not present any
evidence of community standards because the allegedly obscene material speaks for
itself. 7 In stating that obscene material speaks for itself, the Court reasoned that the
material itself is the best evidence of what the material represents.'08 The Court further
explained that the prosecution need not introduce expert testimony of community
standards because jurors presumably know the views of average members of the
community."
The Court's reasoning, however, contains three flaws. First, to claim that
allegedly obscene materials speak for themselves merely begs the question of whether the
materials actually violate community standards because the allegedly obscene materials
In Jenkins, the Court actually viewed the film and reviewed critical commentary that the trial
record contained. Id. at 158-59, 161. Several Justices and clerks, on "movie day," would view feature films
that were exhibits in obscenity cases that defendants appealed to the Court. See WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 233-34 (discussing "movie day" at Supreme Court). A few Justices,
however, refused to attend, not because of the possibility of being offended, but because those Justices
maintained that the first amendment absolutely protected obscenity. See id. at 229, 234 (discussing decision
of Justices Black and Douglas never to attend "movie day"). Of several Justices who attended a screening of
Carnal Knowledge, Justice Thurgood Marshall complained that he thought the Court was "going to see a
dirty movie"; Justice White declared that the film was "obscenely boring"; Justice Rehnquist liked the film's
music; and Chief Justice Burger, who left early, thought the camera work and lighting were well done. id.
at 331.
105 See Lentz, supra note 31, at 62 (noting that an appellate court faces an "insuperable burden" when
engaging in independent review if the record does not reflect community norms).
106 See Schoen, supra note 98, at 580 (noting that main problem in obscenity law is not determining
the community standard that applies, but process by which parties in adversary proceeding illuminate
standard); infra notes 107-135 and accompanying text (discussing procedures that Supreme Court should
adopt to ensure reliability of community standards tests).
107 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
108 Id. at 56 & n.6; see Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 (1966) (noting that the Court
has regarded allegedly obscene materials as sufficient in themselves for determination of obscenity). But see
LEWIS, supra note 53, at 240 (noting that Supreme Court's position that materials speak for themselves is
dangerous because courts and juries might ignore critical opinion in making "serious value" decisions);
Shugrue, supra note 69, at 165 (questioning jury's knowledge of what materials their community will
tolerate).
109 See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977) (holding that juries must apply contemporary
community standards in accordance with jury's understanding of the tolerance of an average person in
community); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974) (noting that jurors permissibly may draw
on their own knowledge of community in making obscenity determinations); Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S.
at 56 n.6 (noting that courts usually admit expert testimony for purpose of explaining to jurors that which
jurors cannot understand) (citing 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 556, 559 (3d ed. 1940)).
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indicate the standards of the publisher, rather than the standards of the community where
the defendant distributed the materials." ° Second, juries probably cannot know the
standards of the geographic community that their legislature defined without hearing
extrinsic evidence for different types of sexually explicit materials."' Third, the opinion
of a twelve-member jury is arguably an insufficient sample of the community to identify
accurately the standards of an entire community or state." 2 Consequently, even though
the jury might comprehend what certain allegedly obscene material depicts, the jury
probably cannot determine, without hearing external evidence of community standards,
whether the depiction violates those community standards." 3
To make any community standards test more accurate, courts should require that
the prosecution establish through expert testimony that the allegedly obscene materials
actually transgress the relevant community standard." 4 Rather than instructing jurors to
draw upon their own experience in determining the community standards, a judge would
instruct the jury to ascertain community standards according to the evidence admitted at
trial." 5 The expert testimony could take the form of scientifically conducted public
opinion polls regarding the types of sexual activity portrayed in the allegedly obscene
1o See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1983)
(noting that even though allegedly obscene material provides best evidence of substantive content, material
fails to supply information about community standards by which jury must judge it); Lentz, supra note 31, at
59 (noting that sexually explicit materials themselves communicate nothing about community's views).
I See Curtis, supra note 71, at 406-07 (noting that Court, by reasoning in Paris Adult Theatre that
jurors already know views of average members of community, improperly solved the problem of determining
what community finds offensive); Lentz, supra note 31, at 59 (noting that because prevailing community
standards necessarily are external to allegedly obscene materials, juries must discover prevailing community
standards through other evidence) (citing United States v. 2,200 Paperback Books, 565 F.2d 566 (9th Cir.
1977)); Shugrue, supra note 69, at 169 (noting that without expert testimony, jury can only make "stab in
the dark" in ascertaining community standards); Hotchkiss, supra note 95, at 842-43 (noting that expert
testimony may be necessary to properly identify community standard for trier of fact); see also MacDougall,
-supra note 71, at 88 (noting "little doubt" that experts strongly can influence trier of fact in obscenity cases).
112 See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 822 (2d Cir. 1956) (noting that no statistician conceiv-
ably would accept views of twelve-person jury as a fair sample of community attitudes on obscenity) (Frank,
J., concurring), affd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), overruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Stevens,
supra note 22, at 710 (noting that twelve juror sample of community is too small to accurately reflect the
attitude of a community) (citing Roderick A. Bell, Determining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1202,
1207 (1977)).
113 See Lentz, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that Supreme Court, by assuming that jury is competent to
gauge the content of prevailing community standards, entrusts jury with "Herculean" responsibility).
114 See Curtis, supra note 71, at 408 (noting that instructing the jury that allegedly obscene materials
speak for themselves and government need not prove elements of obscenity, seriously aggravates the jurors'
ability to accurately apply the obscenity standards); Lentz, supra note 31, at 59 (noting that without evidence
of prevailing standards of community tolerance for obscenity, prosecution cannot prove beyond reasonable
doubt that allegedly obscene material violates community standards of prurience and offensiveness);
Mahoney, supra note 71, at 67-68 (advocating that the Crown in Canadian obscenity cases adduce evidence
of community standards, so long as the evidence represents entire community); Shugrue, supra note 69, at
167 (advocating expert testimony requirement for all three prongs of obscenity standard); Hotchkiss, supra
note 95, at 843 (advocating expert testimony requirement to give trier of fact information necessary to make
obscenity determination). But see Schoen, supra note 98, at 581 (contending that the use of expert
testimony does not solve the problem of imprecise definitions of relevant community standards).
115 See Erikson, supra note 78, at 425 (noting geographical and cultural dimensions that set
community apart and provide important reference points for community members); Hotchkiss, supra note 95,
at 841 (noting that if jury must apply a statewide standard in determining whether materials are obscene,




materials. 116 In addition, qualified experts could give testimony concerning the standards
of the geographically relevant community."7 Accordingly, by requiring that the
prosecution present expert testimony of community standards, the Supreme Court would
ensure that juries have an objective reference point to determine whether the allegedly
obscene material violates the community standard and, therefore, is obscene.
A requirement that trial courts admit relevant defense expert testimony would
also make the Pope standard more accurate. The Supreme Court has determined that the
Constitution does not require that courts admit defendant's expert testimony regarding
community standards." 8 The Court reasoned that a jury does not need expert testimony
to understand whether certain material is obscene.' A jury might, however, require the
assistance of expert testimony to comprehend what the allegedly obscene material depicts,
especially in the case of materials that appeal to unusual sexual preferences. 2 ' Many
courts, accordingly, do permit the defense to present expert testimony to shed light on
community standards. 2' If the Supreme Court changed its current stance on expert
testimony and adopted the proposed requirements, the jury could determine more
objectively whether material is obscene.'22 In addition, appellate courts could more
116 See Regina v. Pink Triangle Press, 45 C.C.C.2d 385, (Prov. Ct. J.D. York, Ont. 1979), in D. CoPP
& S. WENDELL, PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP 399 (1983) (advocating that courts admit competently
conducted public opinion surveys to determine the limits of community tolerance); Roderick A. Bell,
Determining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1202, 1203 (1977) (proposing that public opinion polls
ascertain community standards); Curtis, supra note 71, at 411 (advocating that courts admit scientifically
conducted surveys of public opinion as evidence of community standards); Mahoney, supra note 71, at 64
(noting that Canadian courts encourage parties to offer evidence of public opinion surveys in obscenity
cases) (citing R. v. Prairie Schooner News Ltd., 75 W.W.R. 585, 599 (Man. C.A. 1970)).
117 See Curtis, supra note 71, at 411 (noting that expert testimony on the issue of community
standards "may be highly relevant" to obscenity determinations (quoting Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181,
1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)); Shugrue, supra note 69, at 166 n.37 (suggesting that sociologists, by using
objective factors, can analyze social systems); Stevens, supra note 22, at 711 (noting that expert testimony
may help jury more accurately discern community standards); see also SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY,
supra note 24, at 132 (discussing expert testimony in obscenity cases and suggesting that experts should be
individuals, such as police officers, ministers, journalists, and public officials, whose occupation requires
assessment of community standards).
118 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974).
119 Id. at 100 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973); Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 (1966)).
120 See Shugrue, supra note 69, at 179 (noting that Supreme Court improperly assumes that members
of jury have the requisite exposure to all written, performed, or spoken descriptions of sexual matters) (citing
Terry D. Ross, Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 175 (1966)); see
also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1978) (suggesting that in extreme cases involving
materials that appeal to prurient interest of deviants, prosecution must present evidence to aid jury in
obscenity determination). Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973) (reserving
judgment on jurors' ability to accurately determine, without expert testimony, whether materials appeal to
prurient interest of bizarre deviant groups) (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1966);
United States v. Kiaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167-68 (2d Cir. 1965)) Id.
121 See, e.g., People v. Hanserd, 483 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (Ind. App. Ct. 1985) (holding admissible
psychologist's testimony on an element of prurient appeal of allegedly obscene magazines); Saliba v. State,
475 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ind. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that defense may present expert "community
standards" evidence); Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., 452 N.E.2d 1126, 1132-33 (Mass. 1983)
(noting that defense may introduce expert testimony regarding patent offensiveness or prurient appeal of
allegedly obscene materials). Canadian courts also encourage expert testimony in obscenity cases. See
Mahoney, supra note 71, at 64 (discussing Canadian courts' use of expert testimony in obscenity cases).
122 See Curtis, supra note 71, at 410-11 (noting that expert evidence offered by defendant has crucial
bearing on whether jury makes obscenity determinations objectively); MacDougall, supra note 71, at 79
(noting that courts' admission of expert evidence may increase the credibility of community standards tests);
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easily exercise independent, de novo review because the trial record would preserve expert
testimony regarding the relevant community standards.'23
C. Requiring Admission of Comparison Materials and Marketplace Data Into Evidence
In addition to requiring that the prosecution establish community standards
through expert testimony, and requiring that courts admit a defendant's relevant expert
testimony, the Supreme Court should require that trial courts admit into evidence
comparison materials and marketplace data regarding purchase or patronage. If courts
admit comparison materials that are similar to the allegedly obscene material and readily
available for purchase throughout the community, the defense could rebut the prosecu-
tion's case by demonstrating that the allegedly obscene materials comport with the
relevant community standard.'24 For example, if the jury knew that large quantities of
a comparison exhibit were sold in a county during the period of the indictment, the jury
might conclude that the allegedly obscene material did not violate community standards
of that county.'25 Similarly, statistical evidence of community patronage of an allegedly
obscene film would help the jury determine whether the film violated community
standards. 26 Although the Supreme Court has held that courts can exclude comparison
evidence, 127 many courts do admit into evidence the defendant's comparison evidence
so that the jury can determine whether the allegedly obscene material violates the relevant
community standard.
21
The tangible nature of comparison evidence can provide the jury with a visual
reference point for determining what the community standards are and, therefore, whether
the materials at issue are obscene. 29 One commentator has suggested that because
comparison evidence is tangible, it is even more effective than expert testimony 13 and
thus more vital to the defendant's case.' 3 ' Additionally, comparison evidence could be
Shugrue, supra note 69, at 180 (contending that requiring courts in obscenity cases to admit into evidence
expert testimony would reduce chances of arbitrary jury action).
123 See Shugrue, supra note 69, at 180 (noting that extrinsic evidence of community standards is
"indispensable to effective appellate review").
124 See Lentz, supra note 31, at 49-50 (discussing role of comparison evidence in obscenity cases).
125 See id. at 50 (discussing publisher's attempt to offer comparison evidence of sexually explicit
materials that sold 1.3 million copies in county during six-month period that indictment covered).
126 See Keller v. Texas, 606 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (holding evidence regarding
community patronage of film Deep Throat admissible because "(w]idespread acceptance indicates communi-
ty acceptance"). Id.
127 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-26 (1974) (upholding trial court's exclusion of
comparison evidence).
128 See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that trier of fact may rely on widespread availability of comparable materials to determine that
materials are not obscene); Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1126, 1132-33
(Mass. 1983) (noting that comparison evidence of sexual activity similar to that portrayed in allegedly
obscene material is relevant to show whether the material appeals to prurient interest or is patently
offensive); Berg v. Texas, 599 S.W.2d 802, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (reversing trial court's refusal to
admit comparison evidence).
129 See Lentz, supra note 3 1, at 60 (noting that jurors can examine comparison evidence in jury
room).
130 See id. (noting that comparison evidence may be much more effective than expert testimony in
demonstrating prevailing community standards); see also Curtis, supra note 71, at 412-13 (advocating that
courts admit into evidence comparable materials that the community widely accepts so that jury does not
make obscenity determination in "factual vacuum").
t31 See Lentz, supra note 31, at 60 (noting that courts which do not admit comparison evidence
unconstitutionally might infringe upon defendant's right to present defense).
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an important aid to appellate courts that exercise independent, de novo review of an
obscenity conviction because an appellate court could view the comparison evidence when
the court reviews the jury's decision. 3 2 Because the marketplace basically reflects the
community's tolerance for certain materials, requiring courts to admit comparison
evidence would ensure that juries ascertain as objectively as possible whether the
community tolerates allegedly obscene material.
33
Absent a requirement that courts admit expert testimony of community standards
and comparison evidence of materials that are readily available for purchase or patronage
throughout the community, juries arguably cannot discern either local or national
community standards.'34 Jurors, when applying an obscenity standard, probably would
draw upon their own personal biases, absent evidence of community standards.'35
Courts, therefore, should receive into evidence valid public opinion surveys, expert
testimony, and comparison evidence to aid a jury in discerning how a community member
would evaluate the allegedly obscene materials.
132 See id. at 62 (noting that appellate courts cannot meaningfully and independently review jury
findings without evidence of prevailing community standards).
133 See Note, Community Standards and Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1855 (1975) (noting that Miller's "serious value" prong in making obscenity
determinations conflicts with the Court's First Amendment "marketplace of ideas" metaphor that measures
value by marketplace acceptance in other First Amendment cases); Montgomery, supra note 86, at 407
(advocating inter alles marketplace as indication of "worth and utility" of sexually explicit materials); see
also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (noting that marketplace determines whether sexually
explicit material, as a form of communication and entertainment, has value) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977) (relying on capacity of the
marketplace of ideas to distinguish useful or beautiful works from ugly or worthless works) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). But see CLOR, supra note 24, at 60 (suggesting that circulation of obscenity that statutes
prohibit, but public tolerates, should not enable material to lose obscene status); Mahoney, supra note 7 1, at
65-66 (noting that marketplace acceptance as evidence of community standards abdicates responsibility of
trier of fact to apply community standards when distributors import comparison materials from abroad); Joan
Schleef, Recent Case, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (1983) (noting that admission into evidence of
comparable materials might result in no materials being found obscene in areas that already tolerate sexually
explicit materials).
134 See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 822 (2d Cir. 1956) (noting that no statistician conceiv-
ably would accept views of twelve-person jury as fair sample of a community attitude on obscenity) (Frank,
J., concurring), aff d, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Curtis, supra note 71, at 414 (advocating evidentiary procedures
in obscenity trials that reduce rather than enhance subjective nature of jurors' obscenity determination, as a
matter of North Carolina constitutional law); id. at 404 (noting that in most places in United States, no
consensus regarding obscenity exists "because members of community have very different personal tastes
and standards"); Stevens, supra note 22, at 710 (noting that jury cannot accurately reflect attitude of the
community because twelve juror sample of community is too small). But see CLOR, supra note 24, at 189-
90 (arguing that community beliefs are not susceptible of proof).
135 See Curtis, supra note 71, at 405 (noting that juries in obscenity cases act as "tiny autonomous
legislature[s]") (quoting Roth, 237 F.2d at 822); Stevens, supra note 22, at 711 (noting that without evidence
of community standards, jurors would draw upon their own notions that would not accurately reflect
community attitudes at large); Staal, supra note 24, at 756-58 (discussing roles of emotionally-charged local
values such as jurors' religion, education, economic status, and occupation in jurors' obscenity determina-
tions).
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V. RECONCILING "COMMUNITY STANDARDS" OF TOLERANCE WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW THREE-STAGE TEST
A, A Constitutional Standard of Tolerance: "Explicit Harm"
The Pope test permits juries, in determining prurient appeal or patent offensive-
ness of material, to consider statewide or local community standards of tolerance
according to a state legislature's statute. The Supreme Court could improve on this by
requiring a uniform national standard of tolerance for sexually explicit material,
establishing an objective, "explicit harm" standard.'36 Under an explicit harm standard,
the jury's inquiry would be (1) whether, as depicted by the material, one person inflicted
serious bodily injury upon another person in the course of sexual activity, or (2) whether
one participant most likely did not consent to the sexual activity before production of the
material, or (3) whether, in fact or as depicted by the material, one participant in sexual
activity most likely was a minor. The First Amendment should not unequivocally protect
the circulation of all pornographic materials, (1) because of the possible harm to citizens
inherent in graphically violent sexually explicit material, (2) because of the presumed
harm to persons who do not consent to potentially harmful activities, and (3) because of
the government's compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation and
abuse.131
136 See Urbana v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140, 152-53 (Ohio), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 934 (1989)
("IT]he law should be looking for the existence of 'harm,' not trying to define 'obscenity"') (Brown, J.,
dissenting); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "explicit" as "[n]ot obscure or
ambiguous," "having no disguised meaning or reservation," "[c]lear in understanding").
137 See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that when
government has "strong interest" in forbidding conduct that is subject of material, such as sexual acts
involving minors, government may restrict or forbid dissemination of the film to reinforce prohibition of
such conduct), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Urbana, 539 N.E.2d at 152 & n.13 (1989) (noting two examples
of sexually explicit material which cause harm: publications which utilize minors and publications whose
production requires the commission of a crime) (Brown, J., dissenting); J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195-96 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing "harm principle" argument that, to avoid direct
personal injury to some persons, justifies government restrictions on other persons' liberty).
"Snuff films" - in which sexual characters and, in some cases, the actors themselves are killed
as a necessary element of the sexual activity - always would transgress an explicit harm standard. See
FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 146 (describing violent pornography and "snuff films"). No national standard
of tolerance should condone actual killings, graphically portrayed killings, or graphically portrayed physical
injury in sexually explicit materials. See Urbana, 539 N.E.2d 140 at 152 (noting that "extremely violent
sexually oriented material" is a potential exception to the First Amendment) (Brown, J., dissenting);
FEINBERG, supra, at 147, 149 (noting "harm principle" argument that permits suppression of violent
pornography because violent pornography may incite physical sexual violence). Similarly, child pomogra-
phy always would violate an explicit harm standard because minors legally cannot consent to the activity
and because the potential, if not actual, personal harm to the child actor is extreme. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (noting government's "compelling" interest in safeguarding physical
and psychological well-being of minors); id. at 759 (noting relationship between depictions of juvenile sex
activity and sexual abuse of children). Moreover, some commentators note that not all adult participants in
sexually explicit material consent to the sexual activity before production of the material. See Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 339 (1984) (noting that participants "are
known to be brutally coerced into pornographic performances"); see also Jeffry M. Gamso, Comment, Sex
Discrimination and the First Amendment: Pornography and Free Speech, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1577, 1597




Allegedly obscene material might not violate an explicit harm standard even
though the materials directly would offend most members of the community. 3 An
explicit harm standard is distinguishable from the Pope community standards test, because
the latter standard inquires whether the materials would, in fact, directly offend persons
who normally would not choose to view allegedly obscene materials.'39 By shifting the
focus of the first two prongs of the Pope test from the effect of allegedly obscene material
on unwilling observers to the nature of the material itself, an explicit harm standard would
afford due consideration for those persons who choose to view sexually explicit materials,
while permitting suppression of some materials.' 40
An explicit harm standard, which would be uniform in application throughout the
United States, would provide a guaranteed minimum level of protection to publishers who
distribute sexually explicit materials nationwide.' 4 ' Further, because an explicit harm
standard would be constant throughout the United States as a matter of constitutional law,
the standard would provide a safeguard against local censorship by enabling appellate
courts to exercise independent, de novo review of the jury's findings.'42
B. Proposed Three-Stage Test for Obscenity Trials
A federal constitutional standard based only on "serious value" and "explicit
harm" would create problems in the areas of freedom of expression and public access to
sexually explicit materials in sections of the United States that have more permissive
standards than those at the federal level. 43 For example, New York City arguably has
more permissive standards for sexually explicit materials than the national norm.'" If
a New York City jury faithfully applied a federal standard for obscenity, the jury might
declare material obscene that most members of the New York City community would find
138 See SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra note 24, at 133 (discussing possible interpretation
of Supreme Court's contemporary community standards test, which could find material non-obscene even
though the material directly would offend unwilling observers of the material).
139 See id. (distinguishing between personal offense as a result of directly viewing sexually explicit
materials and personal offense because other persons have access to same materials). Professor Schauer has
suggested that a standard like the proposed "explicit harm" standard, which addresses whether materials'
mere availability to willing observers is offensive to other members of the community, might properly
evaluate sexually explicit materials in obscenity. Id.
140 See DERSHowrrz, supra note 73, at 192 (noting that the critical choice in obscenity regulation is
"between society in which everyone must tolerate some offensiveness at the price of diversity, or society that
permits only expression that is offensive to no one").
141 See SCHAUER,THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra note 24, at 125 (noting chilling effect on distribu-
tion of generally acceptable materials when distributor faces too many different community standards);
MacDougall, supra note 71, at 87 (noting that distributors of material would face "draconian" law if one
town accepted sexually explicit materials, but another town found distributor of the same material guilty of
criminal offense).
142 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing important role of independent review
by appellate courts).
143 SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra note 24, at 119 (noting that national obscenity standard
effectively would prohibit the distribution of material in more permissive communities); Stevens, supra note
22, at 712-13 (noting that a national standard for sexually explicit communication, which precludes states
from creating a more relaxed standard, is not the least restrictive means of protecting the community from
offense) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1973)); Staal, supra note 24, at 753 (noting that
national standards effectively could restrict rather than promote availability of sexually explicit materials and
therefore frustrate free expression).
14 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973) (implying New York City's tolerance toward
sexually explicit materials).
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desirable, or at least tolerate.'45 It seems likely that local juries who have community
standards that are more permissive than a national standard might disregard an instruction
to evaluate allegedly obscene materials with reference to a national standard, and take into
account the more permissive local standards.
146
Accordingly, to. kreserve the cultural diversity of individual states and
communities that are highly tolerant of sexually explicit materials, the Supreme Court
should adopt an analysis that the First Amendment protects materials that do not
transgress state or local community standards of tolerance even if the materials affront
national standards. 147 Similarly, in the interests of freedom of expression and public
access to sexually explicit materials, the Supreme Court should recognize that the First
Amendment protects materials that do not transgress a national standard of tolerance even
if the materials might transgress local or state standards. 148 The Supreme Court could
achieve these First Amendment objectives by adopting a three-stage obscenity test.
The jury would apply the three-stage test in the context of a three-stage obscenity
trial. To make the trial as efficient as possible, stage one would address the question of
"serious value," because even as currently interpreted the First Amendment protects all
materials that have serious intellectual value. 149 During this first stage, the prosecution
145 See id. (suggesting that New York City's tolerance for sexually explicit materials exceeds the
tolerance of Maine or Mississippi for sexually explicit materials).
146 See DEVLIN, supra note 85, at 90-91 (noting that jurors, by acquitting defendant, effectively can
veto government's enforcement of morals); see also SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra note 24, at
121 (arguing that suppression of sexually explicit materials in permissive communities is an illusory danger
under a national standard because prosecutors likely will not prosecute obscenity in truly permissive
communities).
147 See Parker, supra note 102, at 550 (stressing importance of giving citizens, rather than judges, the
first opportunity to vindicate free expression); Waples & White, supra note 24, at 420-21 (noting that if
community believes that government suppression of sexually explicit materials advances no local interest,
the federal government should not interfere with community's judgment). Arguably, the federal government
has no independent interest in denying certain communities access to materials that other communities may
find repugnant. See also CLOR, supra note 24, at 35 (noting that choice of local community, state, or nation
as "community" in contemporary community standards test affects ability of local, state, and federal
governments to regulate obscene expression); Robert M. O'Neil, Federalism and Obscenity, 9 U. TOL. L.
REV. 731, 737-39 (1978) (suggesting that federal punishment of the distribution of obscene materials
implicates problems of federalism); Stevens, supra note 22, at 716 (contending that federal government must
create obscenity regulation to allow states to pursue their own policies).
148 See RICHARDS, supra note 8, at 206 (noting that current obscenity test expresses "extremely
controversial moral judgments that no longer command either general or critical moral consensus"); Schoen,
supra note 98, at 584 (advocating that persons should enjoy national First Amendment rights, undiminished
by local diversity); Waples & White, supra note 24, at 428 n.124 (noting that if "wrong" community
declares material non-obscene that would be obscene under standards of "proper" community, result does not
contravene First Amendment principles). But see CLOR, supra note 24, at 184 (contending that government
has a duty to protect community's common values).
149 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 34 (noting that the First Amendment protects works that have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (noting
that child pornography may have serious value and still be denied First Amendment protection).
Under the proposed obscenity test, material in which a minor participates in sexual activity is
protected if it has any serious value. The Court in Ferber considered "unlikely" the possibility "that visual
depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an
important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work." Id. at 762-63. To
solve the First Amendment dilemma for non-obscene child pornography having serious value, the Court in
Ferber observed that young-looking non-minors could be "utilized" to convey the impression that children
were engaging in such activities, without actually involving minors in the production of non-obscene
sexually explicit material. Id. at 763 (citing People v. Ferber, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (1978)). Ironically, this
"solution" overlooks the possibility, implicit in the Ferber decision, that sexually explicit material depicting
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would present evidence to show that the allegedly obscene material lacks serious value.
If the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, the defense would present evidence to
show that the material does have serious value. The court would admit into evidence all
relevant expert testimony by persons who are qualified to judge whether the material has
serious scientific, political, artistic, or literary value. 5 ° In addition to expert testimony,
the court would also admit critical reviews of books and films. 5'
After the prosecution and defense present stage one evidence, the judge would
instruct the jury to evaluate the allegedly obscene material by determining whether, in
light of the evidence presented, the material, taken as a whole, has any serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 52 The judge would employ a special verdict or
youthful non-minors might nevertheless remain a tool in the sexual exploitation of children that Ferber
sought to prevent. See id. at 759 (noting relationship between depictions of juvenile sex activity and sexual
abuse of children); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 & n.7 (1990) (pointing to evidence that
pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children by showing that other children have "fun"
participating in the activity) (quoting I ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL
REPORT 649 (1986)). Accordingly, material that portrays a minor participating in sexual activity meets the
"explicit harm" standard which comprises stage two of the proposed obscenity test, and might be obscene in
the absence of serious value. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (discussing stage two of
proposed obscenity test that addresses "explicit harm" of material); supra notes 136-42 and accompanying
text (discussing proposed "explicit harm" standard).
Moreover, the Ferber decision is unsatisfactory to properly protect works that have serious
intellectual value. "[Cllinical pictures of adolescent sexuality," or depictions of "children engaged in rites
widely approved by their cultures, such as those that might appear in issues of the National Geographic,"
might not implicate the government's compelling interest in preventing harm to minors. Ferber, 458 U.S. at
775 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A non-obscene, sexually explicit depiction of a child that makes a serious
contribution to the world of art, literature, or science is just as worthy of First Amendment protection as a
similar depiction of an adult. Id. at 776-77 (Brennan, J., concurring). Such examples might include
exhibition of films before a state legislative committee studying a proposed state law, or before a group of
research scientists studying human behavior; depictions of children as part of a "medical or psychiatric
teaching device"; or a documentary on behavioral problems. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring). The most
important consideration in determining whether the First Amendment protects allegedly obscene material, as
the proposed test demonstrates, is the context rather than the content of the depiction. Compare id. (Stevens,
J., concurring) (Justice Stevens comments that "whether a specific act of communication is protected by the
First Amendment always requires some consideration of both its content and its context"). Accordingly,
sexually explicit depictions of children that have serious value are protected under the proposed test for
obscenity. Only when such depictions fail to have any serious value does the issue of potential or presumed
harm to minors become a consideration. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (discussing stage two
of proposed obscenity test that addresses "explicit harm" of material); supra notes 136-42 and accompanying
text (discussing proposed "explicit harm" standard).
150 See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (advocating court's admission of expert testimony
as evidence of community standards).
151 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1974) (referring to a review of film CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE (Embassy Pictures 1971)).
152 Compare Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (requiring that jury apply "reasonable
person" standard to issue of serious value); with Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (noting that in "serious value" prong,
jury determines whether the material "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value") (emphasis
added). Lord Patrick Devlin suggests that the Supreme Court's use of a "reasonable person" in serious value
determinations is inappropriate because moral principles become law according to what a jury finds
acceptable. DEVLIN, supra note 85, at 90. Devlin stresses that for a jury to give a moral principle the force
of law, a random jury of twelve persons unanimously must agree on a verdict. Id.
The serious value prong, however, arguably involves an objective determination of the intellectual
value of allegedly obscene material, rather than subjective moral worth. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 504-05
(characterizing Pope obscenity test as requiring the jury to apply an objective test for literary or artistic
value) (Scalia, J., concurring). Because the jury in making serious value determinations applies objective
constitutional criteria to determine what the community must tolerate, rather than moral principles to
determine what the community chooses not to tolerate, the Supreme Court's requirement that juries
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interrogatory so that the record could preserve for appellate review the jury's findings
regarding each of the four types of serious intellectual value that the First Amendment
protects.'53 If the verdict indicates that the allegedly obscene material has any of the
four types of intellectual value, the material is not obscene and is protected by the First
Amendment.'54 If, however, the stage one verdict indicates that the materials do not
have any serious value, the trial would continue to stage two.
Before stage two of the obscenity trial begins, the judge would instruct the jury
to disregard all evidence that the jury heard in stage one of the trial, because stage two
does not involve an assessment of the value of the allegedly obscene material. Stage two,
rather than addressing the serious value of sexually explicit materials, addresses whether
the material depicts "explicit harm." After the jury views the allegedly obscene material,
the judge would instruct the jury to determine by special verdict or interrogatory (1)
whether, as depicted by the material, one person inflicted serious bodily injury upon
another person in the course of sexual activity, (2) whether one participant most likely did
not consent to the sexual activity before production of the material, and (3) whether, in
fact or as depicted by the material, one participant in sexual activity most likely was a
determine the views of a reasonable person in making serious value determinations is inappropriate in light
of Devlin's account of the "reasonable person."
A better standard to determine serious value of a work, therefore, would instruct the jury to
directly address the question of serious value of allegedly obscene material without regard to what a
hypothetical "reasonable person" might think. By eliminating the reference to a reasonable person in the
Pope test for serious value, the Court would send to juries the message that material having serious value
deserves protection regardless of whether a majority or a minority of a population thinks that the same
material has serious value. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 34 (holding that the First Amendment protects works that
have serious value, regardless of whether the government or majority of the population approves of ideas
that works represent). If the test for serious value in the Court's obscenity standard asked "whether the
work, taken as a whole, has any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," the test more clearly
would achieve the Court's intent in Pope that the First Amendment protects materials that have serious
value. The proposed test differs slightly from the Miller's serious value standard, which essentially requires
the jury to determine the negative proposition: whether serious value is absent from the material. Cf.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (inquiring whether material "lacks" serious intellectual value).
153 Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 49(a) (authorizing judges to use special verdicts). Under Rule 49(a), the
special verdict permits the jury to determine only the facts in controversy, so that the court can apply the
law. Parker, supra note 102, at 550-51. Professors Wright and Miller argue that judges might prefer special
verdicts because general verdicts hide jury error and prejudice. 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2503 (1971). Although no rule similar to Rule 49(a) is
available in the criminal context, the Supreme Court could prescribe that judges use special verdicts in
obscenity trials. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1988) (describing Supreme Court's rule-making power
generally).
Professor Parker advocates the use of special interrogatories in free expression cases. Parker,
supra note 102, at 552; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (authorizing judges to use special interrogatories).
Special interrogatories, by enabling jurors to focus on the determinative facts of the case, assist the jury in
reaching an intelligent verdict. Parker, supra note 102, at 553. Special interrogatories, which outline the
steps that the jury should follow in reaching a general verdict, alleviate jurors' memory problems regarding
the judge's instructions to the jury. Id. Moreover, the special interrogatories place psychological pressure
on the jury to follow the law because the judge can determine by the jury's responses whether the jury
properly applied the law. Id. In obscenity cases, where jurors' personal biases might discourage juries from
following the law, special interrogatories would prove vital in the proposed "three-stage" obscenity test. See
Staal, supra note 24, at 756 (noting that factors such as education, economic status, and religion affect
jurors' attitudes toward obscenity). Although no rule similar to Rule 49(b) is available in the criminal
context, the Supreme Court could prescribe that judges use special interrogatories in obscenity cases. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1988) (describing Supreme Court's rule-making power generally).
154 Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 34 (noting that the First Amendment protects works that have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value). But cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (noting
that the First Amendment does not protect child pornography even if such material is non-obscene).
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minor. 55 If the verdict indicates that the allegedly obscene material'does not depict any
of the three types of "explicit harm," the material is not obscene and the First Amendment
protects the material.'56 Otherwise, the trial would continue to stage three.
Before stage three of the obscenity trial begins, the judge again would instruct
the jury to disregard all evidence that the jury heard in stages one and two of the trial,
because stage three does not assess the serious value or explicit harm of material. During
stage three, the prosecution would present evidence concerning standards of tolerance,
within the geographic "community" that state law prescribes, for patent offensiveness of
sexually explicit materials. 57 Then, assuming that the prosecution could establish a
prima facie case for patent offensiveness under the state obscenity statute, the defense
would present community standards evidence for patent offensiveness.' 58 The court
would admit all relevant expert testimony and comparison evidence of materials available
within the geographic scope of the "community."'59  After the prosecution
and defense present stage three evidence, the judge would instruct the jury to apply to the
Miller patent offensiveness prong the geographic community standard that state law pre-
scribes. '6'
In effect, stage three duplicates the patent offensiveness prong in the current Pope
test.' 6 1 If the allegedly obscene materials are not patently offensive, the material is not
obscene and, therefore, the First Amendment protects the defendant's allegedly obscene
materials. Hence, the government can subject the publisher to criminal penalties only if
material fails stage one, stage two, and stage three of the proposed obscenity test. 6
155 See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text (discussing proposed "explicit harm" standard);
supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing value of special verdicts or interrogatories in proposed
"three-stage" obscenity test).
156 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (advocating that First Amendment protects
materials that do not transgress proposed "explicit harm" standard).
157 Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (requiring in obscenity cases that jurors apply "community standards"
test for prurient appeal and patent offensiveness of sexually explicit materials). In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 160 (1974), the Court noted different examples of what juries properly could declare patently
offensive under the second Miller prong. The Court in Jenkins noted that state statutes could define as
"patently offensive" representations or descriptions of actual or simulated "ultimate sex acts" that are normal
or perverted, representations or descriptions of masturbation or excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals. Id. (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 25). The Court in Jenkins noted that although the list of
"patently offensive" examples was not exhaustive, the list fixed substantive limitations on the types of
materials that juries could find patently offepsive and determined that juries do not have "unbridled
discretion" to determine what is patently offensive. Id. at 160-61.
158 See Lentz, supra note 31, at 48 (noting that defendant's demonstration that materials do not
transgress contemporary community standards is vital to defense of obscenity charges).
159 See supra notes 107-135 and accompanying text (advocating that Supreme Court require that trial
courts admit into evidence relevant expert testimony and comparison evidence in obscenity cases).
160 Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (requiring that in obscenity cases jurors apply "community standards"
test for prurient appeal and patent offensiveness of sexually explicit materials).
161 Cf. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500 (requiring that in obscenity cases jurors apply contemporary commiffity
standards to first two Miller prongs). The proposed "three-stage" obscenity test would eliminate the prurient
interest prong of the current Pope test, because if the material has serious value, the sexual effect of material
on willing observers is irrelevant in determining whether the material deserves First Amendment protection.
See Elkin, supra note 102, at 869 (noting that Pope standard, which requires non-objective standards for the
first two prongs and objective standards for the third prong, is inconsistent because serious value prong and
prurient interest prong overlap).
162 See Curtis, supra note 71, at 414 (noting that government should use criminal sanction in limited
fashion because government has tremendous power and might abuse criminal sanction powers).
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C. Benefits of the Three-Stage Obscenity Test
Stage one of the proposed test is similar but not identical to the third Pope prong;
the stage one test requires the jury to answer directly the question whether allegedly
obscene materials have serious value, rather than requiring that juries apply a "reasonable
person" standard as in Pope.6 3 Moreover, by directly focusing on the issue of serious
value, stage one alleviates the jury confusion in the Pope standard caused by the jury's
application of a "reasonable person" standard that, as a matter of constitutional law, must
yield uniform results throughout the United States." Stage two, requiring that the jury
evaluate "explicit harm," establishes a standard of constitutional tolerance for sexually
explicit material. Stage two of the proposed three-stage test thus accomplishes what the
Pope standard accomplishes for only the serious value prong: implementation of an
objective standard that is uniform and national in application. 165 Stage two of the
obscenity test, therefore, would provide increased First Amendment protection for
publishers by requiring that obscene materials depict explicit harm. 66 Stage three of the
three-stage obscenity test would give local communities who have more permissive
standards access to sexually explicit materials that might nevertheless transgress a standard
of constitutional tolerance. 67 Publishers, therefore, could distribute sexually explicit
materials in specific regions of the United States that have expressed a higher tolerance
for certain materials.
68
Perhaps the most desirable result of the proposed obscenity test would be the
elimination of the parochial censorship that certain local communities have exercised since
163 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Pope "reasonable person" standard for
serious value and the proposed modification of obscenity standard to enable jurors directly to address issue
of "serious value").
164 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01 (discussing "reasonable person" standard for serious value).
165 Cf. Pope, 481 U.S. at 504 (classifying Pope's reasonable person test for serious value prong as
"objective" test) (Scalia, J., concurring); Gey, supra note 2, at 1580 (characterizing serious value prong of
Pope standard as national standard); Taylor, supra note 80, at 267 (interpreting Pope decision to require
objective standard for serious value prong). See also Elkin, supra note 102, at 866 & n.83 (noting that
Supreme Court has defined objective standard as "national" and "uniform" standard).
166 The proposed "three-stage" obscenity standard is consistent with one scholar's opinion that a
definition of obscenity logically could include national standards as a constitutionally permissible minimum.
See Schoen, supra note 98, at 584-85 n.60. Professor Schoen stated further that although localities or states
never properly can provide less protection for expression than national standards allow, localities or states
properly may provide more protection for expression. Id. The proposed "three-stage" standard in effect
implements Professor Schoen's suggestion in the context of an obscenity trial.
167 See Schoen, supra note 98, at 587 (noting that tragic results would occur if United States citizens
who wish to have access to certain materials cannot have access to materials due to restrictive markets or
threats of litigation against distributors). Should a state's courts determine that the state's constitution
absolutely protects obscene expression, no federal prosecution could result under the "three-stage" standard
because a distributor of sexually explicit materials would never violate state standards. See id. at 584-85
n.60 (noting that the First Amendment does not require states to enact obscenity laws). Similarly, some
commentators doubt that the federal government has any interest in punishing obscene expression unless a
certain state makes obscenity a criminal offense. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (doubting that federal government has any interest in
punishing distribution of obscene materials), overruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); O'Neil,
supra note 147, at 737 (same); Stevens, supra note 22, at 716 (contending that federal government must let
states regulate obscene materials).
168 See Shugrue, supra note 69, at 178 (noting that cultural creativity cannot flourish when obscenity
standard becomes "lowest common denominator" of community tolerance throughout United States); Waples
& White, supra note 24, at 446 (noting that community standards of the forum should prevail in resolution




Miller. 69 A further value of the proposed test is that federal obscenity prosecutions
would be more consistent with state obscenity prosecutions, because the three-stage test
incorporates federal constitutional standards for value and harm. As some commentators
have noted concerning federal obscenity prosecutions, interstate distributors of sexually
explicit materials, to avoid criminal sanctions, must conform to the least permissive
standard in the nation because the federal government can prosecute a distributor in any
federal district in which the distributor circulated the material. 7 ' The Supreme Court's
adoption of the three-stage test, therefore, would reduce forum shopping by federal
prosecutors because sexually explicit materials would be protected unless the materials
transgressed constitutional standards of tolerance, in addition to the standards of the state
or local community where the defendant distributed the materials.' 7'
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Pope is a step toward a uniform
obscenity standard that is national in application, the Court does not go far enough in
requiring an objective standard only for the serious value prong. The proposed three-stage
test provides a way for the Supreme Court to ensure a coherent, fair model of obscenity
law. By establishing a three-stage obscenity test that finds obscene only that sexually
explicit material which violates both federal constitutional and local community standards
of tolerance, the Supreme Court would establish a standard that reconciles local
community standards of tolerance and the First Amendment.
The Court necessarily would require various procedural safeguards such as
special verdicts and admission into evidence of valid public opinion surveys, expert
testimony, comparison materials, and marketplace data by the defense.'72 Further, the
Court should require that the prosecution make a prima facie showing that the allegedly
169 See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 102, at 23 (recognizing that excesses
in censorship of sexually explicit materials have occurred since Miller in local communities, and that
excesses continue to increase); LEWIS, supra note 53, at 247 (noting that although Supreme Court might
recognize truly obscene materials, local authorities often are less discriminating); Schoen, supra note 98, at
586 (noting that localities might view Supreme Court's rejection of national standards as an invitation to
vindicate local community standards by "suppressing smut"); Schleef, supra note 133, at 1140 n. 69 (noting
that when singular members of community may initiate procedures to censor sexually explicit materials
while majority remains silent or apathetic, local censorship of sexually explicit materials does not indicate
that community has particularly high standards).
170 See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989) ("There is no constitutional
barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under local
standards even though they are not obscene in others"); Waples & White, supra note 24, at 415 (noting
government's wide-ranging choice of trial districts in federal criminal obscenity prosecutions); Stevens,
supra note 22, at 709, 711-12 (discussing how nationwide venue in federal obscenity cases creates uniform
standard of intolerance for sexually explicit materials); see also SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, supra
note 24, at 128 (discussing dangers of forum shopping and selective prosecution in federal obscenity cases).
For a detailed account of forum shopping in federal obscenity cases, see DERSHOWITZ, supra note 73, at
155-63 (discussing obscenity prosecution in Memphis, Tennessee of actor Herbert Streiker, known as Harry
Reems, for his performance in movie Deep Throat).
171 See O'Neil, supra note 147, at 748 (noting forum shopping in which federal prosecutors have
engaged since Miller decision)Waples & White, supra note 24, at 415 (noting danger of undesirable forum
shopping by government in federal criminal obscenity cases).
172 See supra notes 118-135, 153 and accompanying text (advocating that courts use special verdicts,
and admit into evidence public opinion surveys, expert testimony, comparison evidence, and marketplace
data).
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obscene materials affront relevant community standards.'73 The proposed three-stage
obscenity test would establish a minimum national standard of tolerance for sexually
explicit expression and guard against local censorship. Moreover, the three-stage test
would facilitate appellate review by admitting into evidence, and preserving in the trial
record, testimony regarding community standards and serious value.
17 4
In addition, the proposed three-stage test would provide better First Amendment
protection for national distributors of sexually explicit materials.'75 Distributors could
sell sexually explicit materials that society generally does riot tolerate, in. areas of the
United States with more permissive standards than the nation at large, without fear of
criminal sanction. 7 6 Thus, the three-stage obscenity test would enable local communities
whose tolerance for sexually explicit materials exceeds a national standard of tolerance
to have access to desired materials.
77
173 See supra notes 107-117 and accompanying text (advocating that Supreme Court require
prosecutors to present prima facie evidence of community standards).
174 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing important role of independent review
by appellate courts).
175 See supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text (discussing increased First Amendment protection
for distributors of sexually explicit materials under proposed "three-stage" obscenity test).
176 See Waples & White, supra note 24, at 446 (noting that community standards of forum should
prevail in resolution of obscenity questions so that distributors of sexually explicit materials can send works
into tolerant communities); supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (proposing that First Amendment
should protect materials that do not violate state or local community standards even if materials violate
national standards).
177 By incorporating both federal and local standards in obscenity determinations, the proposed "three-
stage" obscenity test recognizes that no single community standard for obscenity exists. See Schoen, supra
note 98, at 581 (noting that diversity of American society destroys premise that single contemporary
community standard exists).
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